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Sustainable development requires increasing the energy efficiency, decreasing the growth
rates of energy demand, and decreasing the CO2 emissions. In many countries, house-
holds’ energy consumption is responsible for a considerable share of total energy demand
and CO2 emissions. Energy-using durables are essential in this context. Aiming at sus-
tainability, private households should buy more energy-efficient durables and use them
in a more efficient way. In principle, it might even be economically optimal to buy the
more energy-efficient products, since they result in lower total costs over their lifetime –
thus resulting in a positive net present value (NPV). However, when observing private
households’ purchase decisions, they often do not correspond to the economic optimum,
resulting in an “energy-efficiency gap.” This paper investigates into the reasons for the
persistence of such a gap between energy-efficient products that would be economically
optimal – but from which consumers refrain – and less energy-efficient products that con-
sumers actually own or buy although they entail larger life-cycle costs. Factors, which seem
to deter private households from purchasing energy-efficient products with positive NPVs,
are, for example, insufficient information, limited attention, or inertia. We will show how
these and other factors hinder private households from identifying and realizing their eco-
nomically optimal choices and how such barriers can be overcome. We will present how
properly designed energy labels could help to overcome the information-related causes of
inefficiently low energy-efficiency investments and provide some additional policy recom-
mendations that could help reaching the aforementioned goal of a reduction of households’
energy demand and CO2 emissions in an adequate way.
Keywords: energy-efficiency gap, sustainability, insufficient information, limited attention, uncertainty of energy
savings, inertia, energy labels, behavioral economics
1. INTRODUCTION
According to the latest reports of IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel
on Climate Change) the scientific evidence reveals that the prob-
ability for men-made global climate change is very high (IPCC,
2014). The reports show that more than half of the CO2 that is
already stored in the atmosphere had been released during the
last 40 years. The (future) negative consequences of global climate
change can be described more and more precisely and the CO2
amount that can still be emitted until 2050 without endangering
the 2°C goals has to be limited to a maximum of 750 Gt worldwide.
It also turns out that climate policy will not be for free but that, on
the other hand, it seems feasible to save the planet. There will be
reductions in growth rates, but overall, positive growth rates will
persist. Hence, the conclusion from these reports is that we should
act and that it is affordable to act. The sooner we act, the more
affordable it will be.
There are recommendations on how to act to prevent danger-
ous climate change for all different levels, like, for instance, the
aggregate level of country-wide policies or the micro level of indi-
vidual households. In this paper, we are especially interested in
measures adequate for a reduction of CO2 emissions in private
households. The motivation behind is the fact that more than
50% of total current CO2 emissions stem from private households
(including mobility) (Wiki Bildungsserver, 2013; BAFU, 2014).
Mobility, electricity consumption, as well as heating or cooling of
buildings are the key areas in which CO2 is released. This at least
holds for households in developed countries, which is the reason
why we will focus on such countries. There are essentially two
ways to decrease individual households CO2 emissions in these
countries. One would be to reduce the number and intensity of
CO2 emitting uses, the second one would be to make the sin-
gle uses less energy-intensive and hence, given that most energy
uses still have fossil components, less CO2-emitting. Since the first
way just mentioned might be related to serious welfare losses, we
will concentrate on the second way, i.e., on measures to increase
the energy efficiency of different uses. Hereby, we will limit our
analysis to energy-using durables, leaving the analysis of infra-
structural components like heating or cooling systems to further
papers. Energy-using durables are typically responsible for about
80% of a private household’s energy demand and for about 15–
20% of their CO2 emissions (BAFU, 2014; CSR Academy, 2014;
Energybrain, 2014; Euresa, 2011).
Looking at energy-using durables like washing machines,
fridges, coffee machines, TVs, computers, etc., we observe that in
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most developed countries a variety of product types with differing
degrees of energy efficiency and differing prices are available. Only
in some countries and for some products, government regulation
forbids the sale of less energy-efficient product types. Comparing
purchase prices plus current electricity costs for different types
of one and the same product over the product’s lifetime, it turns
out that, taking into account a specific discount rate, it might
be economically optimal to buy the more energy-efficient prod-
ucts. As a rule, these products will be sold at higher purchase
prices. However, the lower current electricity costs throughout the
whole lifetime of the product may outweigh the higher purchase
prices. In economic terms, the net present value (NPV) of the more
energy-efficient appliances will be higher than the NPV of the less
energy-efficient appliances. Private households should hence be
interested in buying energy-efficient durables with a higher NPV.
Yet, one observes empirically that this is often not the case (see
section 2). Many private households do not buy the appliances
that would seemingly be economically optimal for them. This of
course raises the question of why this is the case, i.e., why private
consumers behave in a seemingly non-rational way.
In the literature, this phenomenon is well-known under the
label of the “energy-efficiency gap.” This gap consists of the
discrepancy between energy-efficient or technologically efficient
products that would be economically optimal – but from which
consumers refrain – and less energy-efficient products that con-
sumers actually own or buy although they entail larger life-cycle
costs. From a purely methodological point of view, identifying this
gap is not an easy task and the existing studies are of only limited
value, due to their often short-sighted assumptions about eco-
nomic optimality and time discounting. The literature discusses
possible reasons for this discrepancy, which we will present in
section 2.
In section 3, we will then have a closer look at causes that might
be responsible for the economically non-optimal behavior of con-
sumers when purchasing energy-using durables. Most of these
causes are information-related in one way or the other. So, we will
discuss insufficient information, limited attention and perception
biases, the uncertainty bias, inertia and social network aspects and,
finally, liquidity constraints. Based on this discussion of reasons
for the existence of an energy-efficiency gap, section 4 is then ded-
icated to possibilities of overcoming barriers to technologically
and economically efficient household investments. Given the close
relation of all principal causes to the aspect of information, we will
focus on information format and disclosure types in this section.
Energy labels, especially those for household appliances, will hence
constitute the key example used in section 4. Section 5 will be used
for drawing conclusions on how to cope with the apparent discrep-
ancy between alleged economic optimality and factual behavior of
private households. We will end our paper with some policy rec-
ommendations that could help reaching the aforementioned goal
of a reduction of households’ energy demand and CO2 emissions
in an adequate way.
2. INSIGHTS FROM LITERATURE
Since the early 1990s, a situation in which households’ invest-
ments in energy-efficient appliances seem to be lower than pri-
vately optimal has been referred to as the energy-efficiency gap
or energy-efficiency paradox (Hirst and Brown, 1990; Jaffe and
Stavins, 1994). Investment also – or even more so – seems to be
lower than socially optimal, but it is the private sub-optimality of
investment that legitimates the term “paradox” from an economic
perspective (see Jaffe et al., 2004 for a discussion of different optima
related to energy efficiency). The suggested lack of investment in
energy efficiency leads to a gap between actual and optimal energy
use (Jaffe and Stavins, 1994). The paradox lies in the slow diffu-
sion of apparently cost-effective and energy-efficient technologies
(Shama, 1983). Many households seem to ignore the opportu-
nities of positive NPV investments in high-efficiency durables –
judged by a reasonable market interest rate to calculate the present
value of cost savings (Howarth and Stanstad, 1995). They either
delay the replacement of low-efficiency products or settle for a
low-efficiency product when purchasing an energy-using durable.
The energy-efficiency gap has become an increasingly pop-
ular topic in policy discussions because its reduction promises
“win–win” opportunities. First, it allows reducing the negative
externalities involved in current energy use, such as climate change,
nuclear disasters, or dependencies on fuel imports. Switzerland, for
example, imports 66% of its energy used, mostly in the form of
fossil fuels, with major consequences for the environment, foreign
policy, and the economy (Pomper, 2014). Second, other forces such
as imperfect information may cause households not to undertake
privately profitable investments in energy efficiency (Allcott and
Greenstone, 2012). These forces present investment inefficiencies
that lead to the “[. . .] Energy Efficiency Gap: a wedge between
the cost-minimizing level of energy efficiency and the level actu-
ally realized” (Allcott and Greenstone, 2012, p. 4). Establishing the
existence of an energy-efficiency gap would therefore justify large-
scale policy intervention targeted at closing the gap. In order to
select the right tools for possible policy interventions, it is essential
to identify the potential cause(s) of an energy-efficiency gap – an
issue addressed in this article. In fact, many public policies have
already been implemented to stimulate energy efficiency, leading to
an extensive literature on energy efficiency and conservation pol-
icy evaluation (for reviews of this literature, see, e.g., Gillingham
et al., 2006; Tietenberg, 2009; Abrahamse et al., 2005).
Several studies by McKinsey & Company (Creyts et al., 2007;
Granade et al., 2009; McKinsey & Company, 2009a) and oth-
ers (see, for example, Chandler and Brown, 2009; EPRI, 2009;
National Academy of Sciences, 2009; Rosenfeld et al., 1993 for
a meta-analysis of earlier studies) suggest that certain investments
in energy efficiency could indeed result in net monetary savings for
households and thus improve economic efficiency. In these cases,
the present discounted value of future energy savings would exceed
the upfront costs of investments in energy-efficient equipment and
appliances at current energy costs and thus have a positive NPV.
Hence, such investments would not only help to reduce energy
demand, thanks to their technological efficiency, but would also
be economically efficient.
In their study about the energy-efficiency potential in the U.S.
economy, Granade et al. (2009) in their base case apply a 7% dis-
count rate as the cost of capital, use industrial retail rates as a proxy
for the value of energy savings, and assume a zero price of carbon.
Under these assumptions and for the current state of technol-
ogy, they identify an energy saving potential of $1.2 trillion at an
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upfront cost of $520 billion (not including program costs) through
2020, pointing toward a potentially large energy-efficiency gap in
the U.S. economy. There have been a limited number of such stud-
ies trying to estimate the economic potential of energy efficiency
in Switzerland (see, e.g., McKinsey & Company, 2009b; Infras &
TNC Consulting, 2010; McKinsey & Company, 2010; BFE, 2007).
Infras & TNC Consulting (2010) provide an NPV estimate of CHF
7.6 billion until the year 2035 for energy-efficiency investments
that would also be economically efficient. Hereby, they assume a
constant interest rate of 2.5% and electricity prices increasing by
4% per 5-year period. However, such engineering estimates of the
energy savings potential from seemingly cost-effective investments
suffer from two major flaws: (1) the large sensitivity to the respec-
tive assumptions, such as the assumed discount rates or energy
prices, and (2) the insufficient consideration of the household’s
perspective in the energy-efficiency investment decision (Gilling-
ham and Palmer, 2014). Hence, in order to assess the economics of
energy-efficiency investments, it is necessary to analyze consumer
choices. This will be done in the following.
Attempts to empirically trace the existence of inefficient invest-
ment in energy efficiency in consumer choices date back to the
1970s and 1980s, when a considerable number of studies estimated
the discount rates implicit in actual purchase decisions of energy-
using durables. The rate of time discounting implicitly applied
by a consumer who is indifferent between some smaller earlier
payment and some larger later payment is called the “implicit dis-
count rate.” Epper et al. (2011) provide a simple stylized example
of the method to estimate implicit discount rates (p. 2): suppose
a consumer is indifferent between two products, a high-efficiency
product H with a purchase price pH and running costs cH, all
accruing in t = 1, and a low-efficiency product L with price pL and
running costs cL with pH > pL and cH < cL. Assuming linear util-
ity and equating the present value of total costs pH+ cHexp(−ϑ),
yields an implicit discount rate of ϑ = − ln pH−pLcL−cH .
Table 1 summarizes the estimates of product-specific implicit
discount rates until 2010 (as presented in Epper et al., 2011, p. 2).
DEFRA (2010) observes that (p. 15):
• there is a wide range of discount rates, from 2 to 300%, both
within and across categories;
• most of the discount rates are considerably higher than market
interest rates;
• discount rates are lower when saving energy is the primary
purpose of the investment.
Table 1 | Estimated product-specific implicit discount rates p.a.
Category Discount rate (%)
Thermal insulation 10–32
Space heating 2–36
Air conditioning 3.2–29
Refrigerators 39–300
Lighting 7–17
Automobiles 2–45
Sources: Train (1985); DEFRA (2010).
Ever since the seminal publication by Hausman (1979), the
second observation has been connected to attempts of quantify-
ing an energy-efficiency gap. The difference between the implicit
discount rates (see Table 1) and market interest rates (for exam-
ple, the 2.5% used by Infras & TNC Consulting, 2010), which we
call the “discounting gap,” often proves to be large. Hence, house-
holds are not willing to undertake energy saving investments with
positive NPV, based on a current market interest rate for present
value calculations. Discount rates in the range of 39–300%, as esti-
mated, for example, for the purchase of refrigerators, imply that
households might massively undervalue future energy savings as
opposed to the initial purchase price. This would lead to a slower
diffusion of energy-efficient refrigerators than could be expected
if households realized all positive-NPV investments (Gillingham
and Palmer, 2014). Therefore, the presence of a discounting gap
has commonly been ascribed to irrational purchase decisions by
households – and thus as proof of an energy-efficiency gap.
However, this inference is premature. In order to value the
rationality of households’ purchase decisions, the market inter-
est rate used to assess the discounting gap needs to be adjusted for
the uncertainty about the future benefits of the energy-efficiency
investment, which will be discussed in the next section. Addi-
tionally, the implicit discount rates estimated in most discrete
choice models are a mix of households’ rates of time preferences
and other factors that make it seem as if they were part of the
time preferences, as, for example, unobserved utility components.
Along these lines, Jaffe et al. (2004) challenge the appropriate-
ness of implicit discount rates estimated in energy-conservation
investment decisions to prove the existence of an energy-efficiency
gap (p. 87):
To observe that implicit discount rates are high, however, says
nothing about the reason people make the decisions they
make. One possibility is that people are applying normal
discount rates in the context of significant market failures;
another possibility is that people actually utilize high discount
rates in evaluating future energy savings. [. . .] Thus, high
implicit discount rates, on their own, are neither a market
failure nor an explanation of observed behavior.
While the size of the energy-efficiency gap might thus have
commonly been overestimated, there are several market failures
and systematic behavioral biases in consumer decision mak-
ing that suggest that the gap is real. These explanations of an
energy-efficiency gap are elaborated in the following section.
3. WHY DO CONSUMERS REFRAIN FROM ECONOMICALLY
OPTIMAL CHOICES? BARRIERS TO ECONOMICALLY
RATIONAL BEHAVIOR
In this section, we will analyze in detail some of the reasons that
could explain the existence of the so-called energy-efficiency gap.
Hereby we assume that there are energy-using durables on the
market, which are highly energy efficient and which, at the same
time, are preferable from an economic point of view. If, under such
circumstances, households do not buy the technologically and eco-
nomically better appliances, something must prevent them from
making choices, which are in their best interest. These barriers will
now be looked at in detail.
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3.1. INSUFFICIENT INFORMATION
The first interesting barrier to economically rational decisions
of private households on energy-using durables is insufficient
information or knowledge. Many decision makers know very
little about the short-term and, in particular, the long-term eco-
nomic consequences of using a specific type of an energy-using
durable. At the same time, possibilities to gather such informa-
tion exist and this information is often not even costly, which
limits the contention that decision makers might rationally be
inattentive or informed incompletely (see, e.g., Gabaix, 2014;
Sallee, 2014 for models of rational inattention). These possibilities
are, however, rarely used – due, in part, to some general iner-
tia in decision making, which will be discussed in more detail
later in subsection 3.4 (Loewenstein et al., 2001; Weber, 2006).
Another reason for refraining from collecting the information
that would be necessary in order to make decisions, which are
in one’s own best interest, is the fact that in most countries, the
sums at stake are rather small. Given the low electricity prices,
the monetary savings achievable through technologically and eco-
nomically efficient appliances are not decisive for most house-
holds. Hence, the incentives for collecting additional information
are rather low. Furthermore, even the societal advantage of buy-
ing more energy-efficient durables and making a contribution to
the mitigation of climate change seems not to incentivize decision
makers for compiling more information to compare the differ-
ent types of a specific product like, for instance, a fridge. The
negative consequences of global warming appear very distant to
many people, in terms of geography as well as in terms of time;
the issues seem to be intangible and unimaginable and hence
unimportant for many decision makers (Leiserowitz et al., 2006;
Lorenzoni and Pidgeon, 2006; Leiserowitz, 2007; Lorenzoni et al.,
2007).
Yet, one could argue that private households should not actively
search for information but should be provided – and in fact are
provided – with the relevant information by suppliers, agencies,
utilities, etc. However, much of the available information is acces-
sible from or distributed through channels that are not practical
or not relevant for many actors. If the goal is to achieve a better
level of information among the masses, a first step could consist
in employing the same media that decision makers use in their
daily lives. Nowadays, it appears that the most effective media are
those with a network character, such as Facebook, Twitter, What-
sApp, etc. The main advantage of channeling information through
these media is that they are highly frequented by actors for other
purposes as well, so that the actors do not have to incur addi-
tional costs to gather information about the technological as well
as economic advantages of energy-using durables. Although there
seems to be a tendency that such channels become more and more
important, there is still a lot of information available only in con-
ventional forms, hereby reducing the likelihood to be taken into
account.
A further aspect is the information format. It seems important
to present the information in different ways to the various tar-
get groups. If a target group is addressed in a “suitable” manner,
chances of their actual involvement with the topic rise substan-
tially. Possible forms of presentation include texts or films, comics
or games, newspaper articles or scientific publications, simple and
concrete illustrations that the reader can easily relate to or more
abstract ones, quantitative or qualitative illustrations, and so on.
An illustrative example of the expanding range of conceivable
methods of communicating and informing are websites that cal-
culate individuals’ ecological footprint (Wackernagel and Beyers,
2010). They allow website visitors to see what multiple of Earth’s
resources would be necessary in order to sustain an entire world
population using resources to the same extent as they do them-
selves. This could make decision makers aware of the importance
of making decisions which at the same time are advantageous
for themselves and for the society as a whole, hence combining
technological and economic efficiency when buying appliances.
Further examples include mobile applications that compute the
CO2 emissions associated with a shopping list or the presentation
of the content of a scientific publication in the form of a graphic
novel (Hamann et al., 2013). Depending on the relevant target
group (children or adults, students or working population, men
or women, etc.), the presentation of the information should be
conceptualized differently in order to turn purchase decisions into
well informed decisions, paving the way to individual and societal
optimality.
The insufficient knowledge of many actors also manifests itself
in the fact that they are not aware of their current energy costs
and are not able to mentally categorize potential savings in this
area (Thaler, 1985). Moreover, many actors are not even aware of
how they could adapt their lifestyle in order to behave in a more
sustainable, i.e., for example, more energy-efficient way (Gardner
and Stern, 2008; Larrick and Soll, 2008; Attari et al., 2010). In other
words, many decision makers have no correct ideas about which of
their uses is related to a higher or a lower level of energy demand
or to a higher or lower amount of monetary expenses.
Most actors are cognitively unable to perform cost–benefit
analyses or to calculate option values, i.e., the value of future
courses of action. These skills in turn would be necessary for mak-
ing economically rational decisions. Furthermore, it is also worth
noting that actors often refrain from informing themselves at all
because they fear uncomfortable or negative components of this
information, and tend to try to avoid this type of information
(Cerulo, 2006; Norgaard, 2006). In a similar manner, actions with
possible negative consequences are often avoided, even if the total
potential benefits of an action would exceed its total potential costs
(Bostrom et al., 2012).
Overall, the adequacy and accessibility of information seem
to play an important role. At the same time, the cognitive and
emotional skills of many private decision makers seem not suffi-
ciently trained in order to search for and deal with the relevant
information. Providing suitable information poses a challenge to
scientists as well as firms and government institutions. One step
toward this end may be, for example, to reduce the number of
labels indicating environmental and energy-related effects of the
consumption of specific goods. An additional step would be to
also limit the amount of information which each of the remaining
labels convey. A reduction of information to a comprehensible and
manageable amount would matter. More details concerning ways
to overcome information-related barriers for purchasing techno-
logically and economically efficient household appliances will be
discussed in section 4 of this paper.
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Besides the information provision, decision makers’ capabili-
ties to search and process relevant information would have to be
strengthened. As already mentioned, this must comprise cogni-
tive as well as emotional aspects. Improvements in environment-
related education could be one element in this context.
If the already existing information can successfully be made
accessible and understandable and thus be used more in actors’
decision making, this could help both to eliminate uncertainties
and to improve the information’s credibility. In addition, if more
convincing examples of a strong long-run orientation of actors
could be perceived throughout society, a closing of the energy-
efficiency gap could be reached more easily. This is due to the fact
that adapting to a behavior that is “common” in society is typi-
cally more attractive than swimming against the stream (for more
details, see subsection 3.4).
3.2. LIMITED ATTENTION AND PERCEPTION BIASES
Since Simon (1955), who proposed a model of bounded ratio-
nality, it has been suggested that individuals simplify complex
decisions, for example, by processing only a subset of informa-
tion. Gabaix and Laibson (2006) analyze pricing with boundedly
rational consumers who do not pay attention to hidden features of
product prices, which they refer to as“add-on”costs. This finding is
supported by recent empirical evidence that people are inattentive
to ancillary product costs such as sales taxes (Chetty et al., 2009),
shipping and handling charges (Hossain and Morgan, 2006), or
out-of-pocket insurance costs (Abaluck and Gruber, 2011).
DellaVigna (2009) presents a simple model of attention as a
scarce resource (p. 349):
Consider a good whose value V (inclusive of price) is deter-
mined by the sum of two components, a visible component v
and an opaque component o, V= v+ o. Due to inattention,
the consumer perceives the value to be
_
V = v + (1 − θ)o,
where θ denotes the degree of inattention, with θ= 0 as the
standard case of full attention. The interpretation of θ is
that each individual sees the opaque information o, but then
processes it only partially, to the degree θ. The inattention
parameter θ is itself a function of the salience s∈[0,1] of o
and of the number of competing stimuli N:θ= θ(s,N). Based
on the psychology evidence, I assume that the inattention θ
is decreasing in the salience s and increasing in the compet-
ing stimuli N:θ′s< 0 and θ′N>0. Inattention is zero for a fully
salient signal: θ(1,N)= 0.
Hossain and Morgan (2006) examine eBay auctions where the bid-
ding price of an item is more vivid than the shipping costs, as the
shipping costs are not part of the bidding process and not listed in
the item title. In order to assess the effect of ancillary costs, they
compare a situation without shipping costs (cLO) to a treatment
condition where the shipping costs represent the bulk of total costs
(cHI). In terms of the model introduced above, v is the value of
the item and o is defined as the negative shipping cost: o=− c. In
treatment cLO, Hossain and Morgan (2006) auction CDs with a
$4 reserve price and no shipping cost, while in treatment cHI, they
auction CDs with a $0.01 reserve price and a $3.99 shipping cost.
The change in reserve price guarantees that the two auctions are
equivalent for a fully attentive bidder. The average revenue raised
in treatment cHI is $1.79 higher ($10.16 vs. $8.37) than in treat-
ment cLO, and is higher for 9 out of 10 CDs. These estimates imply
substantial inattention:
_
θ = 1.793.99 = 0.45. A second set of auc-
tions with higher shipping costs (cLO= $2 and cHI= $6), leads to
a smaller increase of revenues in the high shipping cost condition
($12.87 vs. $12.15), corresponding to an inattention parameter
_
θ = 0.724 = 0.18. These results prove that consumers’ attention to
ancillary product costs is indeed limited, especially when the size
of the ancillary costs is relatively small compared to the purchase
price of the item.
In the context of energy-using durables, the “shrouded”
attribute is the running energy cost while the initial purchase price
is much more salient. When buying energy-using durables such as
cars, air conditioners, and light bulbs, households might thus be
more attentive to the purchase price than to the running energy
costs, leading to a higher weight of the former in purchase deci-
sions. As presented in the empirical example above, the inattention
to the energy costs is especially pronounced if they are small com-
pared to the purchase price, as is the case for household appliances
like, for example, refrigerators or washing machines. Therefore,
due to inattention, households are less likely to purchase the more
energy-efficient product that commonly entails a higher purchase
price and lower running energy costs. This effect has been widely
suggested in the theoretical literature as a potentially important
driver of an energy-efficiency gap (see, e.g., Blumstein et al., 1980;
Anderson and Claxton, 1982; Jaffe and Stavins, 1994; Sanstad and
Howarth, 1994; and many others).
Empirical evidence for limited attention in the context of
energy-using durables is scarce, but it seems very likely that the
effects observed in other contexts are applicable to energy-using
durables, especially if the energy costs are low relative to the pur-
chase price. In an artifactual, computer-based field experiment,
Allcott and Taubinsky (2014) assess the effect of an informa-
tion treatment on the purchase of compact fluorescent light bulbs
(CFLs) as opposed to incandescent light bulbs. They find a pos-
itive effect of the information intervention on the purchase of
the energy-efficient CFLs. They try to disentangle how much the
information treatment affected choices through increased atten-
tion vs. updated beliefs. While the wide dispersion in beliefs does
not allow for a clear picture, Allcott and Taubinsky (2014) suggest
that both factors contribute to the treatment effect, thus maintain-
ing that limited attention is relevant in keeping households from
buying CFLs.
Other sources for decision makers’ limited attention are differ-
ent perception biases. Limited attention may be due to the fact
that the relevance of energy efficiency is not present in decision
makers’ subjective experience (e.g., because of very low monetary
expenses for electricity) or because this topic is not sufficiently
addressed in the media (e.g., the consequences of continued usage
of appliances with low energy efficiency are hardly described). In
this context, one often speaks of the so-called “availability bias.”
This bias causes people to perceive especially strong information
that they are already familiar with or information that is mentally
available, while not (or hardly) perceiving other information. An
effect is mentally available if an individual is able to readily and
easily imagine or recall the effect. Some phenomena seem to stick
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especially well in an actor’s memory, namely if the actor has wit-
nessed them first-hand or has access to lively recounts of others
(Jungermann et al., 2005, pp. 173). Examples of the availability
bias involving environmental issues in general as well as climate
change in particular include the 2007 floods in England or the
film The Day After Tomorrow. Both of these instances led to a
temporarily very high awareness for environmental threats. How-
ever, the shocking effect of such events or accounts diminishes
after only a few months and usually entirely vanishes after around
1 year.
Some effects are also strongly perceived because decision mak-
ers infer causalities. If a hot summer is explained as a result of
climate change, decision makers’ perception of climate change is
very strong. This effect is also known as the “representativeness
heuristic,” which owes its name to the idea that an underlying phe-
nomenon (climate change) is deduced from an individual event
(hot summer) that is seen as representative for a group of events
(Jungermann et al., 2005, p. 170).
Furthermore, events contradicting theories and beliefs actors
hold are perceived especially strongly as well. If a very cold winter
occurs, this event does not seem to fit into the general theme of
global warming; so decision makers take particular notice of it.
According to the representativeness heuristic, a very cold winter
may be interpreted as indicating the absence of global warming.
Because this interpretation contradicts a nowadays commonly
held opinion, the phenomenon receives special attention. Stud-
ies show that focusing on climate change as a driver of change
in the observable natural environment of households increases
the households’ willingness to adapt their behavior toward more
sustainable, e.g., more energy-efficient behavior (Alberini et al.,
2013, p. 75).
3.3. UNCERTAINTY BIAS
Purchasing a more energy-efficient durable typically encompasses
larger certain initial costs than a less efficient alternative while
being related to lower but uncertain running energy costs over
the lifetime of the product. A biased perception of the uncertainty
about future framework conditions such as the price of energy
or the amount of energy saved often leads decision makers to
refrain from purchasing the more energy-efficient and economi-
cally rational alternatives (Hassett and Metcalf, 1993; Metcalf and
Hassett, 1999). If it is uncertain, for example, what the prices
for electricity will be over the next 5, 10, or 20 years, or if it is
unclear which technological and social innovations will emerge in
the areas of housing and private consumption in the next 5, 10,
20, or 30 years, this can undermine investments targeting a more
efficient use of energy. Purchase decisions which, for a given set of
parameters, seem rational and economically efficient, might not
be efficient under differing future conditions.
Greene (2011) presents a model that demonstrates how the per-
ception of uncertainty can lead to a bias – the “uncertainty-loss
aversion bias” (ULAB). Due to the uncertainty about the value
of future energy savings, the range of possible net values of the
investment might also embrace the loss domain compared to the
current status quo. If potential losses weigh more heavily in an
investment decision than potential gains – as loss aversion would
suggest (see, e.g., Kahneman et al., 1991) – the possibility of a
potential loss could prevent some consumers from making the
investment (Greene, 2011). Uncertainty coupled with loss aversion
thus contributes to a “status quo bias” because the disadvantages of
change are weighted more heavily than its advantages or chances
(Anderson, 2003; DEFRA, 2010). This effect could be highly rele-
vant for explaining an energy-efficiency gap. If private households
expect, for example, decreasing electricity prices or totally new
types of household appliances for the future, they may be reluctant
to buy more energy-efficient durables today, even if these prod-
ucts are technologically and economically efficient under current
conditions.
Irrespective of their economic effectiveness, energy-efficient
appliances may require behavioral changes when using them.
Using energy-saving shower heads, for instance, changes the way in
which people shower. Decision makers may face substantial uncer-
tainties about possible future returns to their behavioral changes
like reduced monetary costs, increased reputation, etc. As com-
pared with such uncertain benefits, the costs of behavioral change
may seem overly high; a behavioral change and hence the under-
lying purchase of an energy-using durable may be considered as
too risky and may be avoided by a decision maker affected by
the ULAB. It has been shown, for example, that house owners
who are in principle considering a renovation of their house to
increase its energy efficiency often end up refraining from such
a renovation if they are unsure about the development of future
energy prices (Alberini et al., 2013). In order to promote behav-
ioral changes toward economically optimal and energy-efficient
investments, better information and protection with respect to
future (cost-) developments should be provided so that the pri-
vate households’uncertainty can be reduced. Notably, information
about future developments can often only be provided in terms
of probabilities. Yet, many people have trouble understanding and
working with the concept of probability. At least for younger gen-
erations, this highlights a clear educational task while it might
also help to provide the probabilistic information in terms of a
frequency format rather than a percentage format (Cosmides and
Tooby, 1996).
Another aspect of insufficient knowledge and uncertainty stems
from the uncertainty about the behavior of others. If private
households do not know how other households in their surround-
ings or networks will act, they are often not willing to change their
behavior in a way that may have (short-run) negative consequences
for themselves. Such negative consequences could, for instance,
be the higher immediate purchase prices of appliances. Irrespec-
tive of the economic efficiency, private households may refrain
from buying technologically and economically efficient durables
because they are afraid that they will be the only ones carrying
the higher initial costs, while everyone else will benefit from their
behavior, i.e., from their investment in energy-efficient products
(Prisoners’ Dilemma, Kerr, 1983). The willingness to proactively
enter such a scenario is understandably low, but should in many
cases be significantly higher to induce behavioral changes toward
more energy-efficient investments. Only if many other decision
makers were to change their behavior as well and buy more energy-
efficient products with high initial purchase costs and low lifetime
current costs would there be a noticeable impact (Larrick and Soll,
2008).
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3.4. INERTIA, SOCIAL NETWORKS, AND SOCIAL NORMS
A further barrier to purchasing technologically and economically
efficient household appliances lies in the inertia of decision makers
or their aversion toward change, labeled the status quo bias above
(Epstein, 1999). Many decision makers shun the costs associated
with change, which is why they do not change their electricity sup-
plier or tariff despite knowing better, forgo renovations of their
houses and apartments to make them more energy-efficient, or do
not buy new energy-using durables, which might be advantageous
from an individual as well as from a societal point of view. Iner-
tia also restrains people from replacing older, less energy-efficient
appliances which are still functioning through new appliances with
higher technological and economic efficiency. Inertia can in some
cases be explained by the fact that people fear making decisions
that they may regret later on; for example, if future energy prices
turn out differently than was expected when making a decision
(Zeelenberg et al., 2002).
Inertia or the avoidance of costs incurred through behavioral
change appears to be especially large when the behavioral change
is not accompanied by a social compensation, e.g., reputation in
society or special appreciation in friend circles. In this context,
therefore, social networks play an important role (Abrahamse and
Steg, 2009). For one, decision makers can use these social net-
works to receive appreciation for their energy-efficiency efforts.
In addition, they can use the social networks to convince them-
selves that they are not the only ones making an effort for energy
efficiency. The exchange of specific tips and hints can possibly
even make individual investment efforts more efficient and effec-
tive. Given the experience and insights of their friends, private
households may be able to better understand that buying energy-
efficient appliances may not only be advantageous for the society
as a whole but also for themselves, on an individual level, with
respect to long-term economic profitability. The role of experts or
scientists in such networks is ambiguous. On the one side, experts
could prove to be conducive with respect to both, information
about impacts related to various energy-using durables as well as
experience related to prior purchase decisions. However, the pres-
ence of experts may also deteriorate the trust potential within the
network. Empirical evidence on the respective importance of both
effects is still missing.
Related to the social compensation through social networks is
also the effect of role models. If individual decision makers see
athletes, actors, business people, politicians, or other people, they
look up to behave in a certain way, for example, drive smaller cars
or purchase household appliances with high technological and
economic efficiency, this will often induce an imitative effect. This
imitative effect will be stronger the more knowledge about the role
models’ behavior and the more support for the imitative behavior
stems from the individual’s social network (Tsakas, 2012). Thus,
private households might buy energy-efficient appliances with the
hope of hereby attaining social status and appreciation (Bird and
Smith, 2005; Griskevicius et al., 2010).
Social norms prevailing in groups relevant for the decision
makers prove to be crucial to how efficiently they handle their
energy consumption (Schultz et al., 2007; Handgraaf et al.,
2013). When complying with social sustainability norms of the
relevant group, private households may be rewarded by a so-called
warm-glow effect (Andreoni, 1990, 1995), i.e., they might receive
positive utility not only from the consumption of a private good
like an electronic device but also from the contribution to a pub-
lic good, e.g., climate change mitigation. This means that even
if decision makers would not recognize the individual economic
advantage, they could obtain when buying technologically and
economically efficient appliances that they might decide for the
purchase of an energy-efficient appliance due to the related public
good contribution and the respective altruistic utility. Further-
more, in general, social conformity increases most individuals’
utility whereas social disapproval typically generates disutility due
to other individuals’ negative reactions to one’s own behavior
(Masclet et al., 2003; Bicchieri, 2006). Hence, given the dependence
of households’ utility on complying with social norms, measures
shaping such norms in favor of high energy efficiency to be “cool”
and “a must” might result in closing the energy-efficiency gap.
The above mentioned inertia is, among others, a reason why
decision makers are susceptible to nudges (Thaler and Sunstein,
2008). Today, in several countries, nudges are observable in various
areas like, for instance, organ donation, pension savings schemes,
or electricity tariffs (Elektrizitätswerk der Stadt Zürich , EWZ). For
the context discussed here, the idea would be to present economi-
cally efficient appliances as default options in a choice architecture.
Decision makers can opt out of this default option and explicitly
choose a less sustainable alternative instead. Studies have shown,
however, that due to the inertia of decision makers, opting out is
rather rare. This suggests that defaults or nudges might be an inter-
esting way to promote widespread sustainable behavior (Dinner
et al., 2011; Allcott and Mullainathan, 2010). A successful example
related to purchasing energy-efficient and long-term economi-
cally profitable products is the furnishing of new buildings in
the US with energy-saving light bulbs by default (Dinner et al.,
2011).
The nudge approach is occasionally criticized for being pater-
nalistic and imposing on individuals what they should choose to
do. Empirical studies suggest, however, that nudges may rather
help individuals follow strategies that they prefer anyway. For
example, the number of actual kidney donations differs substan-
tially between Germany, where not donating is the default option,
and Austria, where donating is the default option (Nationaler
Ethikrat, 2007). It can be assumed that the actual willingness to
donate a kidney is similar in both countries. A further notable
advantage of the nudge approach is that it can be employed not
only by the government but also by private firms, for instance, by
suppliers of energy-using durables.
Nudges might be especially useful because they reduce the
decision-making costs for private households. Decision makers
often need to incur high costs to gather enough information for
a behavior-altering decision (information is dispersed, sometimes
paradoxical and incomplete, etc., see subsection 3.1), and many
individuals thus avoid the process of seeking information. Instead,
they decide from the onset to keep away from the cognitive effort
associated with the gathering of information, and stick to their
previous behavior (Iyengar et al., 2006; Fasolo et al., 2009; Alberini
et al., 2013). Here, the status quo bias mentioned above also kicks
in. Nudges can help in this situation precisely because they help
individuals with a certain willingness to change their behavior
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to do so without having to perform a large cognitive or general
prospecting effort.
Finally, another form of inertia manifests itself in the fact that
individuals often increase their sustainable behavior with regard
to some resources, but simultaneously reduce their sustainable
behavior with regard to others. An explanation that might be rel-
evant for the context of purchasing energy-using durables is the
so-called moral licensing effect (Mazar and Zhong, 2010). The
moral licensing effect describes a situation in which a private
household overall behaves in a rather environmentally friendly
way, for instance, by refraining from car-driving or traveling by
plane. Then, these consumers may have the impression that they
have invested enough effort into fostering sustainability and that
there is no need to purchase energy-efficient appliances with high
purchase prices. This may hold even in case of economically effi-
cient appliances as long as the economic efficiency is not noticed
(see, e.g., subsection 3.2).
It is possible that the moral licensing effect is based on the
so-called single action bias (Weber, 1997). According to this bias,
often only one single change of behavior is made, for example,
the general switching off of the standby-mode, without any addi-
tional energy saving or efficiency-increasing behavioral changes.
Decision makers often already achieve a clear conscience through
one action, and further behavioral changes are no longer perceived
as necessary. This effect is also closely related to the “finite pool
of worry” effect (Weber, 2006), which states that the behavioral
changes caused by concern about climate change or limited nat-
ural resources are not infinite. If one is especially concerned about
one area (for example, about the CO2 emissions caused by flying),
one tends to be less concerned about other areas (for example,
about the energy efficiency of household appliances) and not to
change one’s behavior in these other areas.
The exchange in social networks can help abate these effects,
for example, if it becomes clear that the other members of the
social network make sustainability efforts in some areas without
making downward adjustments elsewhere. The minimum level of
sustainability individuals seek to achieve can be influenced by the
respective norm in the individual’s social network and can thus
be moved up or down (Schultz et al., 2007; Kotchen and Moore,
2008; Baeriswyl et al., 2011).
3.5. LIQUIDITY CONSTRAINTS
A further important reason for the gap between the availabil-
ity of technologically and economically efficient appliances und
households’ factual purchase decisions lies in households’ liquid-
ity constraints (Golove and Eto, 1996). Even if households might
wish to purchase the economically efficient energy-using durable,
they are often not able to afford these options financially. This issue
mainly arises because most energy-efficient appliances are char-
acterized by higher initial investment costs and lower operational
costs than less energy-efficient appliances. The high upfront costs
have to be financed, which can fail due to the lack of personal finan-
cial resources and a lack of willingness or opportunities to take
on debt. It is also possible that households’ liquidity constraints
are not factual but only perceived due to a limited financial bud-
get for household appliances. This separation of monetary funds
into different mental accounts violates the fungibility virtue of
money and thus represents a type of behavioral bias called“mental
accounting” (Thaler, 1985).
Actual liquidity constraints and the perception of an unfavor-
able relationship between benefits and costs or risks of sustainable
behavior are often closely linked. In economically rather limited
situations, risks and costs of energy-efficient investments are often
overestimated, while their benefits tend to be underestimated,
especially if the decision makers have a rather short-term perspec-
tive. Additionally, a liquidity constrained decision maker is more
likely to possess preferences for the present so that the likelihood
of long-run oriented purchases of energy-using durables is low.
If one is able to make information about the private and societal
benefits of technologically and economically efficient appliances
more accessible and more credible, this could contribute to more
energy-efficiency investments in spite of liquidity constraints. The
integration of such information into private households’ social
networks could make a significant contribution in this context.
Furthermore, new business models could help reduce the liq-
uidity requirements of decisions in favor of energy-efficient and
economically rational durables and thus make this barrier less
important. For example, with energy providers charging a higher
monthly fee for newly bought efficient household appliances over a
longer period of time instead of charging a relatively high purchase
price once, one would support individual “purchase” decisions
that could close the energy-efficiency gap. Such models already
exist, for instance, within the area of investments into heating or
cooling systems for individual property houses (Schläfli, 2012).
These business models could be promoted using policy instru-
ments, as for example, tax rebates or exemptions. Such models
would help low-income households to enlarge their portfolio of
feasible purchases of energy-using durables and could result in
more durables’ purchases which at the same time foster individual
economic well-being as well as societal (environmental) welfare.
4. OVERCOMING THE BARRIERS: THE EXAMPLE OF
ENERGY LABELS
Since energy-using durables can be used over a relatively long
period without being depleted, the respective purchase decisions
are rather complex and cognitively demanding. They have a long
time horizon, requiring estimates on running costs for several
years into the future. Such decisions present a challenge for many
households, which is why availability, perception, and processing
of information play an important role. Allcott and Greenstone
(2012) even state (p. 19): “Imperfect information is perhaps the
most important form of investment inefficiency that could cause
an Energy-Efficiency Gap.” In this section, we thus focus on
information problems to exemplify the policy implications of the
energy-efficiency gap (for a broad discourse about policy responses
to barriers to energy efficiency, see, e.g., Gillingham et al., 2009;
Tietenberg, 2009; Gillingham and Palmer, 2014).
Allcott and Taubinsky (2014) always mention imperfect infor-
mation in combination with limited attention (p. 3): “[. . .] we
focus on imperfect information and inattention because results
from other literatures suggested that these two distortions could
be large, [. . .].” Any information intervention can serve both
to eliminate imperfect information and to direct the attention
of households toward subsets of information that they were
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previously inattentive to. Therefore, Allcott and Taubinsky (2014)
state (p. 3): “It is thus not unreasonable to assume that our infor-
mation treatment is what we call a pure nudge: it informs all
previously uninformed consumers and draws full attention to
energy costs, with no other effects.” In their artifactual field exper-
iment of light bulb purchases, Allcott and Taubinsky (2014) find
that the information treatment reduces both imperfect informa-
tion and inattention, and thus increases purchases of the more
energy-efficient CFLs.
In real world, labels portray an established instrument for infor-
mation disclosure. In the context of energy-using durables, energy
labels are a policy instrument used in many countries. There are
several, mostly hypothetical studies analyzing the effects of dif-
ferent energy label formats on households’ purchase decisions.
Rohling and Schubert (2013) provide a thorough review of the
literature on energy labels for household appliances. They show
that a variety of energy-efficiency labels exist around the globe. The
aim of such labels is to influence consumers’purchase decisions for
household appliances by making them more energy-efficient. The
way in which these labels are designed differs significantly. While
some labels display details of a product’s energy consumption in
physical units (kilowatt hours), other labels focus on monetary
units (for instance US$). Most energy labels currently applied
globally accumulate a product’s energy use over the period of
1 year, while the energy consumption for a single use or for the
product’s expected lifetime could be alternative information pre-
sentation formats. The way in which information is presented mat-
ters since it directly impacts consumers’ purchase decision. Larrick
and Soll (2008) show that labels may even enhance less energy-
efficient decisions if the presented information is not perceived
properly (MPG Illusion).
As visualized in Figure 1, energy labels can be divided into two
categories: endorsement labels and comparative labels (see Wiel
and McMahon, 2005). Endorsement labels are essentially “seal-
of-approvals” that are applied only to the most energy-efficient
models of a specific product class or to model meeting certain
sustainability criteria. Most endorsement labels are voluntary.
FIGURE 1 |Types of energy-efficiency labels.
The probably best known endorsement label, the ENERGY
STAR, was launched in 1992 in the US and is now also applied in
many other countries such as most European countries, Canada,
Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and Taiwan (see Figure 2A). The
label identifies energy-efficient products in more than 40 cate-
gories, including major office equipment products, heating and
cooling equipment, lighting, home electronics, buildings as well
as plants. Other endorsement labels are, for example, the Chinese
Energy-Conservation Certificate (see Figure 2B), the Recognition-
type Energy Label in Hong Kong (see Figure 2C), or the High-
efficiency Appliance Certification in South Korea (see Figure 2D).
Endorsement labels typically do not contain much information
(Banerjee and Solomon, 2003). Since seal-of-approvals do not pro-
vide any product-specific information on energy consumption, no
differentiation with respect to energy efficiency is possible among
the labeled products.
Comparative labels, the second category of energy labels, pro-
vide a solid comparison of household appliances in terms of their
energy efficiency. In most countries around the globe, comparative
labels are mandatory: several household appliance categories are
required to display such a label. Currently, labels follow two dif-
ferent approaches: labeling with categories (bar or dial/gage) and
labeling with a continuous linear scale. In the first approach, prod-
ucts are put into different energy-efficiency categories. The labels
allow a comparison of appliances across, but not within each
energy-efficiency category. This approach is, for example, used
for the EU Energy Label (see Figure 3A). From 1994 onward,
retailers were required to display this label on new refrigerators,
freezers, washing machines, and some other products like ovens
or water heaters (European Parliament, 1992). The label originally
had seven energy-efficiency categories A–G, with A being the best.
In addition to the letter grades, energy-efficiency categories are
visualized by bars of different color and length: green and short
for A, red and long for G.
The energy-efficiency category that a product is assigned to is
indicated by a black arrow located next to the colored bar. Since
2010, three new categories A+++, A++, and A+ were added
for refrigerating appliances, washing machines, and dish wash-
ers to respond to significant energy-efficiency improvements of
these products (European Parliament, 2010). The design of the EU
energy label is also used by several other countries, among them
Switzerland, Brazil, Iran, Tunisia, and China (see Figure 3B).
Australia and similarly Japan, Thailand, South Korea, and India
categorize electronic devices on a dial or gage (see Figures 3C,D).
Depending on the product, five to seven stars rather than bars
indicate a product’s energy-efficiency category. A product’s energy
class is visualized by the number of stars that are highlighted in
color, the more the better. In the second approach, a continuous
linear scale displays the range of energy consumption between the
most (left end of the scale) and least (right end of the scale) effi-
cient appliance with similar product features. A product’s relative
performance is indicated by a small black arrow above the scale,
the further left the better. Information on the product’s energy use
or energy costs, respectively, is attached to the black arrow. This
format, which allows a direct comparison of energy consumption
between appliances of even similar efficiency levels, is used for the
US EnergyGuide and the Canadian EnerGuide (see Figures 3E,F).
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FIGURE 2 | Endorsement labels – (A): ENERGY STAR, (B): Chinese Energy-Conservation Program, (C): Recognition-type Energy Label, (D): South
Korean High-efficiency Appliance Certification Program.
FIGURE 3 | Comparative labels – (A): EU Energy Label, (B): Chinese Energy Label, (C): Australian Energy Label, (D): Japanese Energy Label, (E): US
EnergyGuide, (F): Canadian EnerGuide.
Currently, comparative labels not only differ with respect to
their visualization of energy efficiency, i.e., categorical vs. contin-
uous scale labels but also in their way of presenting information on
energy consumption. The EU Energy Label, for example, provides
several types of physical information, e.g., kilowatt hours/annum
or water (in liters) per year. However, no information in monetary
units is disclosed on this label. By contrast, the US EnergyGuide
displays estimated yearly operating costs, i.e., monetary units, in
the center of the label, while physical units are placed less promi-
nently. The order of priority was reversed as part of a redesign
of the label in 1994. However, since 2005 energy operating costs
have again been placed in the center of the label. A new generation
of labels has been introduced by the U.S. Environmental Protec-
tion Agency in 2011 for vehicles. It combines annual physical and
monetary with an estimate of fuel costs over 5 years compared
to the average new vehicle (EPA, 2011). The energy label used
in Japan displays both economic and physical information, with
yearly operating costs being placed more prominently. No unam-
biguous empirical evidence exists on whether monetary rather
than physical units are advantageous for impacting customers’
purchase decisions. Advantages of providing monetary figures are
that money is a widely used unit with a clear meaning for con-
sumers. Monetary indications may provide economic incentives to
reduce energy consumption and hence to purchase more energy-
efficient appliances (McNeill and Wilkie, 1979). On the other hand,
energy prices differ remarkably within the European Union or the
US. Therefore, monetary units on the energy label might provide
misleading information for consumers’ purchase decisions.
Interestingly, irrespective of the fact whether monetary or
physical units are displayed, all labels accumulate the respective
information over the time period of 1 year. For specific product
classes, like, for instance, washing machines, averaged annual data
over several years may provide meaningful information. However,
no label provides information on expected life-cycle energy con-
sumption or costs. Since consumers typically perceive information
as more important when a larger number is indicated (see, e.g.,
Camilleri and Larrick, 2014; Burson et al., 2009), presenting life-
cycle information might strengthen the case for energy-efficient
appliances. Yet, providing life-cycle information is no easy task and
requires several assumptions, e.g., on product lifetime or discount
rates, which may be contested.
In their literature review on empirically measured effects
of different energy-efficiency label formats on consumers’ pur-
chase decisions, Rohling and Schubert (2013) find that energy
labels might indeed impact households’ purchases of energy-using
durables. However, which label format is best for guiding
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households’ choices toward more energy-efficient products
remains disputable. Their synthesis shows that neither presenting
energy use in monetary units nor in physical units was unam-
biguously relevant. Implications of presenting lifetime instead of
annual information of a product’s energy use were more con-
sistent. The impact of labeling proved to be stronger when the
information of energy use provided was accumulated over the
product’s expected lifetime. These effects,however, tend to be small
and, at least in some studies, are not significant. Thus, while no
unambiguous recommendation can be given as to whether mon-
etary or physical units ought to be disclosed, lifetime information
tends to have a stronger effect on energy-efficient purchases than
monthly or yearly data.
On the other hand, it should be noted that the empirical evi-
dence on the effect of the energy label on households’ purchase
decisions of energy-using durables is still rather sparse and domi-
nated by hypothetical experiments and surveys. There are very few
studies of actual purchase decisions, as for example, by Anderson
and Claxton (1982) or Kallbekken et al. (2013). Additional stud-
ies on the effects of different energy label formats on households’
purchase decisions of energy-using durables are thus desirable.
5. CONCLUSION
It turns out that there are several reasons why private house-
holds refrain from purchasing energy-efficient appliances even
if it would be advantageous for them from an economic point
of view. Hence, by providing economic incentives, private house-
holds’ energy demand cannot be reduced as strongly as it would
be possible if this energy-efficiency gap did not exist. Attempts to
close the energy-efficiency gap would provide “win–win” oppor-
tunities: (1) private households could profit from lower running
energy costs if they purchased economically efficient energy-using
durables, and (2) societies on an aggregate level could mitigate cli-
mate change while moving toward more independent and secure
energy systems.
It is thus highly relevant to identify the reasons for the persis-
tence of the energy-efficiency gap in order to enable the design
of targeted policy interventions. These reasons lie essentially in
information-related problems like insufficient information, lim-
ited attention, and uncertainty bias as well as in psychological
factors like inertia on the one hand and social networks and social
norms on the other hand. The third relevant category consists
in households’ liquidity constraints, which might be factual or
perceived constraints.
From a policy perspective, it seems most worthwhile to pri-
marily tackle the information-related reasons for the persistence
of the energy-efficiency gap. Such measures seem to be highly cost-
efficient. One possibility is hence to promote and design energy
labels in a way that helps to convey the information of economic
optimality to households. Concerning the other factors hinder-
ing energy-efficient investments, liquidity constraints – especially
the factual ones – could be overcome by exempting households
in need from some of the investment costs that would have to be
raised in order to purchase energy-efficient appliances. The psy-
chological factors seem to be the most problematic when trying to
close the energy-efficiency gap. They require a lot of refinement in
choice architecture surrounding purchase decisions with respect
to energy-using durables because factors like social norms can-
not be easily set or altered by regulating agencies. It seems as if
more research efforts would be needed in this area. On the other
hand, one might suppose that already accepting the relevance of
social norms and of social networks would bring some success.
Innovation in the area of social networking is required. Some
approaches like, for instance, using firms as catalytic for informing
their employees about the economic optimality of more energy-
efficient appliances in their private homes, are already in sight and
seem quite promising (Pan European Networks, 2014).
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